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There is one case in New York" which is somewhat similar to
the case under discussion. The testatrix in that case established a
trust for her five dogs. The surrogate, after referring to many previ-
ous decisions in other jurisdictions, held it to be invalid, not because.
animals were the beneficiaries, but because it violated the rule against
perpetuities. To be considered charitable, a trust must include an
indefinite number of animals and not merely a few specified ones.
Another objection raised was that the provision of the trust
might allow money to be used in the creation or maintenance of a
haven for wild animals. Probably this objection was based on an
English decision which held that a trust to establish a game preserve
was not charitable. 9 The court reasoned that a game preserve would
benefit wild animals, and since wild animals are not beneficial to
mankind, the trust was not charitable. This distinction has been
vigorously attacked by the text writers as too narrow.10 The court in
this case dismissed the objection because the surrogate had deter-
mined that it was the intention of the testatrix to provide for the care
of domestic animals.
Presiding Justice Hill, in dissenting, argued that Section 12 of
the Personal Property Law was passed to reestablish the English
common law relating to charitable uses and no authority or text deal-
ing with the meaning of the words charitable or benevolent under
the common law of England showed that they contemplated a bene-
faction to other than the human group. He further argued that the
reasons which sustain the perpetual application of income from in-
vested funds and the use of real property for the relief and aid of
the human race do not apply to the benefaction, care and relief of
dumb animals.
The court in its result is in harmony with the majority view.
However, in its opinion, it seems to have avoided the wealth of au-
thority in other jurisdictions, and the text writers on the subject.
G. P. O.
CRIMINAL LAW - CONSPIRACY - EXTORTION - CONVICTION OF
ONE DEFENDANT NOT INCONSISTENT WITH ACQUITTAL OF Co-
DEFENDANT.--Appellant and a co-defendant were indicted jointly for
extortion and for conspiracy to extort. The alleged taking of money
from the proprietor of a garage by threats, was pleaded as the ex-
nized as one in which the community has an interest" (i.e., in seeing that animals
do not suffer).
s Matter of Howells, 145 Misc. 557, 260 N. Y. Supp. 598 (Surr. Ct. 1932).
9 In re Grove-Grady (1929) 1 Ch. 557.
10 BOGERT, THE LAW OF TRUSTS AND TRusTEEs (1935) § 379; Scorr, THE
LAW OF TRUSTS (1939) § 374.2; see More Game Birds in America, Inc. v.
Boettger, 125 N. J. L. 97, 14 A. (2d) 778 (1940).
RECENT DECISIONS
tortion and as one of the overt acts in the conspiracy count. At the
close of the trial, the court, without objection, dismissed the con-
spiracy charge. The jury then acquitted the co-defendant and con-
victed the appellant of extortion. Held, conviction affirmed. Verdict
of guilty against appellant was not inconsistent with jury's acquittal
of co-defendant. People v. Scheppa, 295 N. Y. 359, 67 N. E. (2d)
581 (1946).
The main point of argument of appellant had its basis in the
principle that where two and two only are indicted for conspiracy,
an acquittal or reversal as to one is an acquittal or reversal as to the
other.' Appellant, relying on the fact that the people had asserted
that the two defendants had acted in concert, with the same guilty
intent, sought to so link the two crimes that the law applicable to
conspiracy would affect his conviction on the extortion count. Fur-
ther, the appellant attempted to so clothe the extortion as to give to it
the attributes of a joint crime even without the express charge of
conspiracy.
The court drew a distinction between crimes which are by their
nature joint, and those which can be committed by one person with-
out any confederate. Conspiracy falls in the former classification.
2
It is a combination between two or more persons, with the unity of
design to do an unlawful act or a lawful act unlawfully.3 No one
person, acting alone, can commit a conspiracy and the rule put forth
in People v. Kuland 4 necessarily applies. But extortion is not of
this nature. It is defined as "the obtaining of property from another
, * . with his consent, induced by a wrongful use of force or fear,
or under color of official right." r There is nothing necessarily joint
about the crime of extortion. It is such that if two or more persons
are jointly indicted and tried before the same jury for its commis-
sion, the jury may, if the evidence warrants the difference in finding,
convict one and acquit another.6
In the present action the conspiracy accusation had been stricken
from the record before the case went to the jury. Since the actions
were not merged,7 the jury could convict or acquit the defendants
on the extortion count.8  The jury found that the appellant's co-
defendant lacked criminal intent and was acting in the capacity of a
friend of the complainant when he urged complainant to accede to
appellant's demands, believing that discretion in compliance would
1 People v. Kuland, 266 N. Y. 1, 193 N. E. 439 (1934).
2 People v. Hamilton, 165 App. Div. 546, 151 N. Y. Supp. 125 (3d Dep't
1915).
3 Russell v. Stampers, 57 Misc. 96, 107 N. Y. Supp. 303 (Sup. Ct. 1907).
4266 N. Y. 1, 193 N. E. 439 (19341.
5N. Y. PmVAL LAW § 850.
6See Davis v. State, 75 Miss. 637, 23 So. 770 (1898).
7 People v. Tavormina, 257 N. Y. 84, 177 N. E. 317 (1931).8 N. Y. Caut. Cona § 443-a.
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serve complainant better than valor in resistance. The court found
no reason to disturb this verdict.
Surprisingly, the facts and crimes being of such a common
nature, this appears to be a case of first impression in New York.
The logic of the court in dealing with this problem emits of no other
opinion but that the decision is based upon a sound legal foundation.
J. R.S.
DOMESTIc RELATIONS-DIVORCE-A-DULTERY-PRESUMPTION OF
LEGiTIMAc.-Plaintiff, husband, sues for an absolute divorce and
the only evidence of adultery is an inference sought to be drawn
from the length of the period of pregnancy. The husband, an officer
in the Merchant Marine, left Norfolk for the Pacific on April 24,
1944 and did not return to the United States until after January 4,
1945. The defendant gave birth to a child on April 14, 1945 which,
denying misconduct, she claims is the child of the plaintiff. The
plaintiff adduced no evidence reflecting upon the conduct of the de-
fendant. He offered no evidence to associate his wife with any para-
mour or with any act of indiscretion. He seeks a decree solely upon
the hypothesis that it is impossible that so long a period as 355 days
could intervene between coition and parturition. A gynecologist
called as an expert witness by the plaintiff testified that the accepted
period of gestation was 270 days, the longest authenticated case be-
ing 320 days, he admitted that there was a non-authenticated case
of 369 days. A physician called by the defendant as an expert testi-
fied that there have been cases of 344 days. The physician who
attended the defendant during her pregnancy testified that the head
of the foetus was engaged for 68 days before birth, whereas birth
normally occurs within one month after such engagement. Held,
complaint dismissed. The plaintiff has failed to sustain the burden
of proof and the court can not say, on inference alone, that the de-
fendant has been guilty of adultery unsupported by any evidence re-
flecting on defendant's conduct. Lockwood v. Lockwood, - Misc. -,
62 N. Y. S. (2d) 910 (Sup. Ct. 1946).
A case decided in England appears to be very similar in many
respects where the protracted pregnancy was 331 days. Viscount
Birkenhead in dismissing the petition said:
In this case the only evidence of adultery is the admittedly abnormal length
of pregnancy. No other fact or circumstance has been adduced which in the
slightest degree casts any reflection upon the chastity or modesty of the re-
spondent, who has on oath denied the alleged adultery. I can only find her
guilty if I come to the conclusion that it is impossible, having regard to the
present state of medical knowledge and belief, that the petitioner can be the
father of the child. The expert evidence renders it manifest that there is
no such impossibility. In these circumstances I accept the evidence of the
[ VOL. 21
